Sunrise Saviour? by Carter, Stewart
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T he "sunrise" industries policy has undoubtedly been a major political success for the new 
ALP federal government. Against a 
backdrop of continuing crisis in 
Australian industry, the "sunrise" 
industries appear as symbols of hope 
and regeneration, promising a bright 
new industrial dawn, and giving 
credence to the election propaganda 
o f a " c a m p a ig n  o f n a t io n a l 
reconstruction". Moreover, they are 
said to be the harbingers of the so- 
called "technological revolution".
"Sunrise" industries are the rising sun 
of a mighty new movement of new 
technology, changing the entire face 
of industry in roughly the same way as 
the advent of steam and mechanisation 
changed the face of Britain during the 
Industrial Revolution.
This statement, from the chairman of 
the Australian Scientific Industry 
Association, was quoted in an article 
on the front page of one of the leading 
Australian daily newspapers recently. 
The p ro m in e n c e  and im p l ic i t  
credibility given such an extraordinary 
claim h ig h lig h t the urgency of the 
task for the left in deciding where it 
stands in the midst of an apparent 
" re v o lu tio n " . Are the "su n rise " 
industries really going to be our 
ind us tria l saviours and, equa lly
importantly, are our existing industries 
really doomed to eventually disappear 
into the industrial "sunset"?
Before attempting to answer these 
questions, however, it is as well to 
recognise that the "sunrise" industries 
policy is not a peculiarly Australian 
product. It represents, in fact, another 
manifestation of the general social 
phenomenon, apparent in all the major 
advanced industrial countries today, of 
an increasing preoccupation with the 
e c o n o m ic , so c ia l and p o lit ic a l 
co nse qu en ces  o f te c h n o lo g ic a l 
change and scientific development.
In large part, th is  increasing  
preoccupation is a response to the 
profound social, political and moral 
implications of the new developments 
in areas such as genetic engineering 
and the like. But it is also, though less 
obviously, a consequence of the 
continuing international economic 
downturn. With traditional strategies 
for the stimulation and even mere 
maintenance of economic growth in 
capitalist countries having,, for the 
most part, fai led over the last decade or 
so, policy makers have increasingly 
tu rn e d  th e ir  a t te n t io n  to  th e  
c o n tr ib u t io n s  o f s c ie n t if ic  and
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technological development. One of the 
most striking expressions of this new 
focus of attention was to be found in 
the communique of the June 1982 
"summit" meeting of the heads of the 
seven major advanced capitalist 
nations:
The revitalisation and growth of the 
world economy will depend to a large 
extent upon co-operation between 
countries in the exploitation of 
s c ie n tif ic  and te c h n o lo g ic a l  
development. Industrialised countries 
will have to exploit the immense 
opportunities presented by new 
technologies, particularly for creating 
new employment....
In this sense, then, the March 1983 
federal election presented Australia 
with an opportunity merely to fall in 
step with the rest of the capitalist 
world by voting .... for a new ALP 
government which had, as a central 
plank of its economic, industry and 
science and technology platforms, a 
commitment to special government 
ass is tan ce  fo r  16 new "h ig h "  
technology-based industries; the so- 
called "sunrise" industries.
Much of the credit (or blame) for the 
policy undoubtedly lies with the 
indefatigable energies of the new 
Minister for Science and Technology, 
Mr. Barry Jones. He was also the
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A large part o f the Labor 
government's strategy for 
employment rests on the I 
claims of so-called "sunrise 
industries" — the futuristic 
i n d u s t r i e s  b a s e d  on  
i.microprocessors, computer 
software, genetic engineer­
ing and so on. But what are 
the implications of this 
policy for employment and 
for Australia's beleaguered 
m a n u fa c t u r i n g  i nd u s t r y  
where most jobs are now 
located? Are the sunrise 
industries a promise or a 
threat? ....
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person who first introduced the 
industrial metaphors of "sunrise" and 
"sunset" into the everyday lexicon of 
Australian political economy. It's 
probable, too, that Jones borrowed 
both these metaphors, and much of 
the intellectual baggage that goes with 
them, from America, where they 
seemed to enter the language about 
the same time as the emergence of the 
"A tari" Democratsgrouping in the U.S. 
Congress, i.e. about mid to late 1981*. 
But they were almost unknown in 
Australia in the middle of 1982 at the 
ALP's biennial national conference 
when the new policy was first unveiled.
S tric tly  speaking, they were not actually a part of the science and technology platform adopted at 
the ALP's national conference, but 
only included in a paper prepared by 
Barry Jones to accompany the new 
policy. In fact, they were only initially 
slipped into the text in brackets, as can 
be seen from the following extract.
. . . .  can a nation with only 15,000,000 
people, a mere 4 percent of the 
English-speaking world, and whose 
high-technology industries are 
overwhelmingly under foreign control, 
make a transition towards newly 
developing types of high-technology 
("sunrise") industries as wealth 
g e n e ra to rs , and which w ill 
compensate for the long-term decline 
in employment in traditional 
manufacturing ("sunset") industries?"
Leaving aside the etymology of 
sunrise and sunset for the moment, the 
question Jones asked clearly begs an 
answer. The answer he gave was, of 
course, yes, and the list of "sunrise" 
industries to be established was given 
as —
■ biotechnology
■ computer software
■ bio-chips
■ scientific instruments
■ solar energy
■ hydrogen generation and storage
■ shape memory alloys.
By the time of the election, some 
seven months later, the "sunrise" 
industries metaphor had become part 
of the official policy and the list of new 
industries to be established had grown 
to 16. The policy had also, by the time 
of the elections, become incorporated 
in the manufacturing industry policy as 
well, and was, in fact, jo intly released 
during the campaign by Barry Jones 
and John Dawkins, then shadow 
minister for industry and commerce. 
The follow ing extract is from the 
m a n u fa c tu r in g  in d u s try  p o lic y  
document released in February 1983:
. . . .  It is a matter of urgency that 
Australia takes steps towards newly 
developing "Sunrise" industries as 
wealth generators, and to compensate
•  US workers undertaking robotic 
repair courses.
for the long term decline in 
employment in our traditional 
industries .... A priority for a Labor 
government will be the identification of 
the "Sunrise" industries for the 1980s 
and '90s, and the channelling of 
investment to them. The best prospect 
for Australia at the moment is 
Biotechnology .... Other industries will 
be identified and assisted according to 
their potential. The list that follows is 
intended as indicative and not 
exhaustive. Some areas not listed may 
emerge unexpectedly, as has' often 
happened with technology in the past, 
personal computers 
custom-made computer chips 
scientific instrumentation 
medical technologies 
lasers
communications technology 
industrial ceramics 
solar technology 
shape memory alloy 
fusion energy research' 
intermediate technology projects 
hydrogen generation and storage 
biomass
Press reports of the policy launching 
indicated that $30 million was to be 
spent establishing these industries, 
with the money to come from a 
ren am ed  A u s tra lia n  In d u s tr ie s  
Development Corporation, and a new 
Australian Industrial Research and 
D eve lop m e n t In ce n tive s  Board 
"investment fund” .
Clouds Roll In: The "Big 16"
The policy is well worth examining in 
detail, and not only to see how far it has 
been departed from when actually in 
government. For instance, the first 
thing to note about the policy is that 
one of the industries was missing — 
robots was mistakenly left off. (Good
old human error!) More seriously, 
though, the policy established an 
entirely new principle in Australian 
industry and industry assistance 
policy: namely, the selection of a list of 
industries for special government 
assistance. In economists' vernacular, 
the ALP's new policy has put the 
government in the business of "picking 
winners" in the industrial market place.
To most conservative economists, 
with their child-like faith in the 
superiority of the free market, and a 
deep-rooted aversion to almost any 
form of government intervention, the 
sunrise industries policy is therefore 
an abomination. If "picking winners" is 
about picking future profit makers, 
they would argue, then this is best 
done by corporations and entreprem- 
uers, for making profits is their special 
skill; governments, they would argue, 
have a proven track record for picking 
losers — the Concorde being an oft- 
cited example.
For my purposes here, this is largely 
irrelevant. More important, now that 
the ALP is actually in government, is 
deciding whether the industries that 
have been "picked" are, or are not, ever 
going to be "winners” . Of course, this 
is impossible to predict in advance of 
th e ir  a c tua l e s ta b lis h m e n t and 
operation. But it is possible to get some 
sort of idea as to the probability of the 
chosen industries turning out winners 
by looking at the criteria used in 
choosing them.
■  ■nfortunately, the criteria are 
t  M nowhere clearly spelt out in the 
policy documents, and it is only 
possible to piece them together from 
various comments by Bob Hawke and 
Barry Jones. Hawke, for instance, in 
his campaign opening speech said 
that, "We will select new intermediate 
and high technology industries in 
which Australia has special skills and 
o p p o rtu n itie s  and support the ir 
establishment." But this is so general 
as to be useless. A more detailed 
exposition on the selection criteria was 
given by Jones to an industry 
conference earlier this year where he 
said that the list actually chose itself, 
and that the sunrise industries chosen 
fell into two different categories:
( I)  areas where Australia was at the 
leading edge of research .... and where 
an international market niche seemed 
likely, or
(II) areas where Aust'alia would itself 
provide a major market.
However, later on in the same speech 
he also claimed in respect of the 
selection procedure that
. . . .  we put emphasis on high potential 
sectors where we have a comparative 
and com petitive technological
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CCAC/H/g/t rec/ino/ogy
advantage or where we Have an 
established or emerging technological 
capability.
Leaving aside the question of what a 
"high potential sector" might be, it is 
fairly clear that the selection criteria 
change somewhat each time they are 
described. Looking at the list again, it 
is also apparent that "b iochips" was 
considered eligible for inclusion in a 
list of only seven in July 1982, but not 
eligible for a somewhat larger list in 
February 1983. One is tempted to 
inquire as to whether our "comparative 
and c o m p e t it iv e  te c h n o lo g ic a l 
advantage" in "b iochips" manufacture 
somehow evaporated in the space of 
only eight months. Variation between 
the two lists might be said not to matter 
very greatly, in so far as the lists are 
only meant to be "indicative" and not 
"exhaustive", but many have since 
taken the list to be very much fixed and, 
indeed, one recent press report 
referred to it as "the big 16". To add to 
the con fus ion , the report also 
described the list as 16 "categories" of 
sunrise industry. For good measure, 
the "big 16" were said to have been 
chosen
....because they are fields in which 
Australian technologists have made 
good progress despite poor financial 
resources.
T he question thus arises as to the basis on which any such list of "k e y " indus tries  shou ld  be 
chosen for, quite clearly, only the 
fuzziest of notions underlay the choice 
of the so-called "big. 16". Orthodox 
economics would, of course, respond 
"comparative advantage". Certainly, 
this was cited as one of the rationales 
used in the ALP's (or Barry Jones') 
selection process but, looking again at 
the list, it is d ifficu lt to see that any of 
them are areas in which Australia has a 
clear comparative advantage. Indeed, 
one commentator recently claimed 
that "A u s tra lia  has no obvious 
com para tive  advantage in high 
te c h n o lo g y " .  He w e n t on to  
demonstrate his point in somewhat 
humorous terms by listing the various 
advantages that have been claimed by 
the different Australian states in their 
attempts to attract high-technology 
industries:
. . . .  clean water for Canberra, pure air 
for Tasmania, tertiary education for 
Perth and Adelaide, the existing 
Australian electronics industry for 
Newcastle and Wollongong, "bright 
people" and "established reputation" 
for Queensland.
The co n c e p t o f co m p a ra tive  
advantage is obviously subject to 
interpretation in itself. Economic 
history textbooks, for instance, to the
best of my knowledge, still claim that 
the utter destruction of Japan's and 
West Germany's industrial bases in 
World War II gave those countries 
a subsequent comparative advantage 
in industrial development, due to their 
industry having to start from scratch 
with the latest and most sophisticated 
technology and capital equipment. 
Accordingly, I am almost prepared to 
accept Barry Jones' dictum th a t" .... in 
the area of high technology industry, 
c o m p a ra tive  advan tage  is no t 
bestowed, but rather created" and, for 
the moment, forget about worrying as 
to how we are ever going to create in 
this country a comparative advantage 
in "fusion research", for instance.
Sunrise Industries or 
Sunrise Technology
The second problematic aspect of 
the list is related to the concerns 
arising from the poorly detinea
selection procedure. In short, the 
second problem is whether the 
"s u n r is e "  in d u s tr ie s  are re a lly  
"industries" or, in fact, whether they 
could be more appropriately called 
sunrise "technologies". Returning to 
the list again, it is fairly cleartosee that 
some of the "industries" listed are 
quite product-specific, as it were, such 
as custom-made computer chips, 
while others, such as communications 
technology, are really very broad, 
covering, in fact, a generic field of 
products. Communications technol­
ogies nowadays include such a diverse 
range of technologies and products as 
television, radio, telephony, satellite 
communications, etc. etc. Other 
elements of the list are only indirectly, 
or even not at all, related to products 
and would probably best be described 
as possibly very promising areas in 
pure science and technology research.
The lis t  is, then , in its e lf , 
somewhat confused, and contains a 
heterogeneous range of products, 
generic fields in technology, and 
promising areas of scientific and 
te c h n o lo g ic a l  re s e a rc h .  N o t 
surprisingly therefore, it has been the 
source of a good deal of confusion and 
has, as we shall see, caused a great 
deal of d ifficulty in implementation.
The Policy Rationale: Post- 
Industrialism & Employment
The third problematic aspect of the 
sunrise industries policy derives notso 
much from the list itself, but from the 
accompanying rationale for the policy 
and, in particular, the claim that the 
urgency of the need to identify "key" 
sunrise  industries  deserving of 
government support rests, in large 
part, on the need to develop industries 
as wealth generators and " .... to 
compensate for the long-term decline 
in employment in our traditional 
manufacturing industries".
T he question of how much "w e a lth "  and how  m uch employment the new high- 
technology industries might generate 
was addressed in some detail at the 
lAC's public hearings on its new 
technoloav references earlv this vear.
Clearly, there is little point in the 
government granting a great deal of 
assistance to an industry which is 
never going to produce a great deal of 
wealth or employment. Of course, at 
the same time, it is very d ifficu lt to 
predict with any accuracy what an 
" i n f a n t "  in d u s t r y 's  e v e n tu a l 
employment and wealth-generating 
capability might turn out to be. The 
D e p a r tm e n t  o f S c ie n c e  and  
Technology, in its submissions to 
these hearings, was pressed to make 
some predictions, but was sufficiently 
cautious not to do so beyond pointing 
out that high-technology industries 
overseas had experienced high growth 
rates. The minister was, however, not 
so cautious in an interview published 
in the department's new glossy 
magazine "Ascent" (to the summit?). 
He clearly believes that not only will 
the sunrise industries themselves grow 
quickly, but also that they w ill be major 
c o n tr ib u to rs  to  o u r a gg rega te  
economic growth.
I think it is fair to say that we have set 
out two major priorities, first, getting 
the sunrise industries going because 
of their economic impact on the 
community as a whole. It is a major 
growth factor. If we are going to get a 
5% growth rate over a three year period 
as the Prime Minister has indicated,
Unfortunately for the Atari Democrats, Atari Inc. ran into 
financial difficulties very shortly after they started using its 
name. To add to their embarrassment, Atari began laying off 
some hundreds o f its workers and eventually closed up some 
o f its American plants and relocated them in South East Asia.
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CANADA’S *  CAPITAL
CATALYST F O R  HIGH TECH SUCCESS
Factor
N°.l
Access To Government
The federal government has the 
largest procurement capability of any 
organization in Canada, especially 
products of a high technological 
nature. For exporting firms, proximi­
ty to decision-makers in the Export 
Development Corporation, C1UA 
and the Department of Industry, 
Trade and Commerce and Regional 
Economic Expansion is a real benefit. 
Ottawa-Carleton firms have bene­
fited significantly from key goverrv 
ment programs such as STEF and 
the Office Communications Program.
Research and Development 
Facilities
There are nearly 5.000 persons 
holding PhD’s in Ottawa-Carleton, 
more per capita than any other major 
high technology region in Canada. 
Nearly half of i.ie federal intra mural 
science expenditures are spent in 
laboratories and departments locate 
in the National Capital Region. Local 
high tech firms benefit from close 
personal interaction with the National 
Research Council the C om m untt 
tions Research Centre and other 
major labs, as well as convenient 
access to new equipment in 
government laboratories and to high 
cost government testing facilities.
Factor
N°.3
Innovative Environment
The Ottawa-Carleton high tech­
nology community is one of the 
most exciting work environments 
in North America today. 1 he 
camaraderie existing among hrms 
such as Digital, Mitel, Bell Nor­
thern Research, Gandalf and 
C o m p u tin g  Devices coupled 
with access to the new Ontario 
Microelectronics Technology Centre 
and the federal research establish­
ment places the region at the 
forefront of new developments. 
A supportive infrastructure has 
emerged to help new ideas progress 
to commercial successes and many 
new startup firms exist because 
of this environment.
Lifestyle
A wide choice of available housing, 
restaurants of all types, professional 
football, theatre, national symphony, 
ballet, endless j o g g i n g  and cross
country trails, nearby skung, etc aU 
create an environment to which 
employees are readily attracted and 
retained.
Labour
Ottawa-Carleton has developed a 
fine labour pool to support high 
technology. The area graduates 10% 
of Canada’s electrical engineers. 
Algonquin College has 2300 full-time 
students in science-related programs. 
Local industry reports waiting lists ot 
highly motivated assemblers. Salaries 
in the private sector in Ottawa- 
Carleton are competitive with other 
major centres in Canada and not 
influenced by federal government 
wages. Employee turnover is low.
Educational Facilities
University of Ottawa and Cadeton 
University, with combined fuH-time 
enrollment of nearly 20,000 students 
have initiated co-op programs with 
industry and a close cooperation with 
local ihdustry ensures that programs 
are related to needs. Continuing 
business management programs, are 
available through Algonquin College 
and the two universities.
Send me your High Tech Info-Pac.
(Attach Business Card).
c-pc
4 0
—  J » - i i  -
Commercial and Industrial Development 
Corporation of Ottawa-Carleton
222 Queen St., Suite 700 
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K ir  
( 6 1 3 ) 2 3 ^ 5 0 ^
devoted to new technology.
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you can't do that on RED scheme 
revisited, and on tree planting. You 
have got to have some high yield 
elements in it.
The obvious fallacy in this argument is, 
as the IAC has put it:
The extent to which the development 
of nominated "sunrise" industries 
could contribute to the employment 
and growth prospects of Australian 
industry depends as much on their 
absolute size as it does on their 
prospective rates of growth.
Looking once again at the list, it is 
obvious, not only that none are more 
than tiny industries currently, by 
traditional manufacturing industry 
standards (i.e. where they are, in fact, 
industries at all), but also that none are 
ever likely to be very large employers.
The reality of the employment 
potential of the sunrise industries is, 
indeed, one of the most peculiar 
fe a tu res  o f the  w ho le  su n rise  
industries policy. Any number of 
public statements by Barry Jones 
could be cited to show that he does not 
believe the sunrise industries will ever 
be large employers. Certainly, that is 
the general thrust of his book Sleepers 
Awake, and what he has told the 
federal parliament on at least one 
occasion. Moreover, he has even been 
fairly reliably reported as believing 
. . . .  that Australia needs to foster strong 
high technology industries to create 
wealth, rather than employment, to 
allow a smaller proportion of the 
population to participate in the 
conventional workforce and keep a 
larger proportion in reasonable 
conditions outside it. ■
Thus, in so far as the policy was sold 
to the Australian people at the last 
election (and perhaps earlier to the 
ALP itself) as designed to " .... 
com pensate fo r the dec line  in 
e m p lo ym e n t in o u r tra d it io n a l 
manufacturing industries", one coudl 
well say that the Australian people had 
been sold the proverbial "pup".
Sunrise versus Sunset: The 
Future o f Manufacturing
The last problematic area in the 
policy that I would like to address is the 
nature of the "sunset" industries. As 
has become clearly apparent since the 
election, some industries have not 
taken too kindly to being so called. The 
term "sunset" industry in fact never 
actually appears in either of the 
relevant ALP election policy platforms, 
but has just as assuredly percolated 
into our everyday parlance as the 
"sunrise" metaphor. Just as with the 
meaning of that latter metaphor, 
however, it is d ifficult to identify which 
industries it actually applies to. Barry 
Jones, for instance, in his enthusiasm 
to welcome the advent of the post­
ind us tria l soc ie ty  (or, as it is 
sometimes called, the "post-postman" 
society), often blithely consigns the 
whole of manufacturing industry to the 
"sunset" category, as the following 
extract from one of his more recent 
speeches indicates:
Since the mid-1970s there has been a 
growing recognition that Australia's 
economic base has been undergoing a 
fundamental change — a decline in 
employment in manufacturing and a 
growth in employment in services .... 
Australia has been passing through a 
P o s t-In d u s tria l R evo lu tion  w hich  
began here about 1965-66. Our decline 
in manufacturing employment is not a 
temporary anomaly to be rectified by 
tariffs, wage freezes, bounties, quotas 
and other fiscal measures.
The re a lity  of m anu factu ring  
ind u s try 's  s itu a tio n  is, however, 
somewhat different from the picture 
painted by Barry Jones. Manufactur­
ing industry employment grew very 
strongly from 1966. the date at which
ih e  s u p p o s e d  p s o t - in d u s t r ia l  
revolution began in Australia, through 
to 1973. The increase over the period 
was some 150,000 jobs. And although 
manufacturing employment has fallen 
quite dramatically since 1973, with a 
loss of nearly 250,000 jobs over the 
decade from August '73 to August '83, 
the fall has not been one of continuous 
downward slide. Most of the jobs, 
some 200,000 of them, were lost over 
the five years to iy /8 . The current 
recession has also had a major impact 
with some 59,000 jobs disappearing in 
manufacturing during the last year (to 
August '83), but over the four years 
from August '78 to August '82, 
manufacturing employment remained 
fairly constant, even showing a slight 
increase. Similarly, over the three 
years to 1980-81, eight out of the 
twelve ASIC manufacturing industry 
subdivisions showed either a constant 
or a growing demand for labour.
C learly , then, the future of manufacturing employment is a contingent matter. Given the 
right macro-economic conditions, and 
a pp rop ria te  governm ent po lic ies, 
there is every reason to bejteve, from 
the evidence that manufacturing 
employment would begin to grow 
again. Indeed, the director of the Metal 
Trades Industry Association said
much the same thing when he recently 
claimed that —
If the potential for the development of 
metal-based industries can be realised 
and we achieve employment growth in 
the order o f that recorded after the 
1974-76 recession, a minimum of 
150,000 jobs could be created in the 
industry over the next seven years.
In summary, then, it needs to be 
pointed out that the decline in the 
abso lu te  level of m anufactu ring  
industry employment which has 
characterised most of the last ten years 
or so, may not be as permanent as 
many would have us believe. Certainly, 
manufacturing continues to produce 
real wealth and, over the decade to 
1980-81, showed real increases in the 
value of its gross product for all but two 
years (1974-75 and 75-76) out of the 
last ten. Tnus, if the sunrise industries 
are only to produce more wealth, and 
not more employment, in coming 
years, and require high levels of
industry assistance at the same time, 
one wonders what really distinguishes 
manufacturing as a whole from the 
sunrise industries in terms of what they 
are both expected to contribute to our 
economic future.
An Evaluation: 
Prospects and Promises
The great expectations that have 
been built up around the "sunrise" 
industries policy are likely to be largely 
unfulfilled. It is, perhaps, just as w e ll, 
then, for the ALP, that the emerging 
international recovery has reduced the 
necessity for the sunrise industries to 
be among the major contributors to the 
national economic recovery. One, 
albeit an impressionistic measure of 
this reduced importance was recently 
to be found at the national technology 
"summit" where, over the course of the 
three days of the conference, the list of 
sunrise industries failed to come up for 
discussion at all.
N onethe less, the budget and 
subsequent announcements have 
shown that the sunrise industries 
policy is still one of the main planks of 
the government's industry policy. The 
recommendations of the Academy of 
Technological Sciences Committee on 
High Technology Financing have been
Barry Jones.... in his enthusiasm to welcome the advent o f the 
post industrial society (or as it is sometimes called, the "post­
postman" society), often blithely consigns the whole o f the 
manufacturing industry to the "sunset" category ....
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•  The University of Wollongong, situated in one of Australia's heavy industrial 
regions. From February 1984, the university's Centre for the Study of Technology 
and Social Change will provide a research consultancy service for state and federal 
governments.
almost entirely accepted, and some 
$200 million in tax deductions is to be 
made ava ilab le  to investors in 
com pan ies fin a n c in g  o the r high 
technology companies over the next 
five years. It remains to be seen 
whether this scheme will actually 
finance a new venture capital market 
as envisaged, or whether it will merely 
attract "vulture capital", seeking a new 
tax avoidance shelter. But, either way, 
it is still a large amount of government 
revenue which is being foregone — 
revenue which may well have to be 
made up in some other area of 
taxation.
S imilarly, the government has announced a Droaram of capital injection of $12.5 million every 
year, for the next five years, into the 
government-owned but autonomous 
A us tra lian  Indus try  Developm ent 
Corporation (AIDC). More important­
ly, the AIDC's borrowing limits have 
been almost doubled, from something 
in the order of $800 million to around 
$1500 million. And the reason given — 
to enable commercialisation of new 
CSIRO discoveries.
There can be little doubt, then, that 
th e re  has s u d d e n ly  been  a 
c o m p a ra tiv e ly  la rge  am oun t of 
government money made available for 
investment in new technologies
To say that such a development, with 
little or no safeguards on the social 
impact of these new technologies, was 
a p ro b a b i l i t y  u n d e r a L a b o r 
g o ve rn m e n t, w ou ld  have been 
unthinkable only a few short years ago. 
N eve rthe less , th a t is w ha t is 
happening and, seemingly, with the 
approval of much of the population 
and the labour movement. ACTU 
policy is still that technological impact 
statements should be enforced on 
e m p lo y e rs  in t r o d u c in g  new  
technologies, but even less is heard of 
this part of the policy than the other 
part, sim ilarly ignored by governments 
and employers alike, demanding that 
prior consultations with employees 
and unions about techn o lo g ica l 
changes should be compulsory.
What, then, does one make of the 
sunrise industries policy as a whole. 
Has it been, in fact, a very successful 
Trojan Horse, hiding a wholesale 
commitment by the state to a 
technological revolution, primarily in 
the interests of capital, undertheguise 
of an illusory promise of new jobs in 
new industries for the unemployed. 
Or is it, instead, a necessary step in the 
maintenance of the future economic 
v ia b i l i t y  o f A u s t r a l ia  as an 
independen t, advanced indus tria l 
trading nation?
There are no easy answers to these 
questions, however important they 
may be, and I shall not pretend that I 
can answer them.
There is, though, one very definite 
conclusion which can be drawn form 
all this: that is, that in contrast with the 
situation in the late 1970s, a type of 
technological determinism has once 
again achieved a hegemonic status in 
Australian society. It is impossible to 
give a brief and satisfactory definition 
of what technological determinism is 
but, in general terms, it refers to those 
social theories which ascribe social 
developments as having been caused 
by au to no m ou s  m ovem ents  in 
technology, and/or which promote the 
idea that, for whatever reason, we have 
no choice but to accept continuing 
technological development along the 
same lines as in the past.
The idea can be readily perceived in 
the  te rm s su n rise  and sunse t 
them se lves . As m e ta ph o rs  fo r 
industries they clearly imply the 
existence of a cycle in industry 
development where each industry has 
a sunrise and a sunset period; periods 
determined not by general social 
factors, but by reference to something 
in h e r e n t  in  th e  te c h n o lo g y  
in c o rp o ra te d  in th a t in d u s try 's  
products and/or processes. Thus, 
a sunrise industry is one built on new 
technology, while a sunset industry is 
one whose technology is old and 
"mature".
In fact, of course, the eocnomic 
situation of an industry is determined 
by a host of other factors besides the 
relative age of the technology used. 
Moreover, if the technology that is 
being used is reasonably modern, then 
the age of the technology is likely to be 
one of the least important factors 
explaining an industry's relative health 
or sickness.
Thus, to the extent that the sunrise 
industries policy incorporates the 
technologically determinist thesis that 
certain industries are, because of 
something inherent in the technology 
they use, "sunset" industries, the 
sunrise industries policy is not only 
wrong, it is dangerous. Little wonder 
that Barry Jones was not invited to 
addres the national economic summit. 
Adapting an old but venerable wisdom, 
where matters of new technology are 
concerned, let's look long and hard 
before we say we have no choice but to 
leap.
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